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REASONABLE RATES 
T HE principles underlying the decisions of the Interstate Com-merce Commission are, for the most part, admittedly sound 
, principles, and their number is not inordinately great. But 
to lawyers, and students of law, the application of these principles 
seems, in casual reading, to be made as whim or fancy dictates. It 
is a frequent complaint of the lawyer that there is no law in rate 
<;1.ecisions. 
The law is there, the principles are there, and their application 
has been usually made with wisdom. But there seems no clear con-
tinuity of controlling principles. There has been but a frail struc-
ture by stare decisis erected. Almost every question is to some extent 
looked upon as new. 
The reason for this condition is found in the fundamental fact 
that the. factors controlling rates are variable. Bvery element that 
enters into rate-making has a variable value. Its weight is deter-
mined by other elements. So that .in no controversy can a fixed or 
determining value be attached to any one factor considered alone. 
At first sight this gives to the rate decisions a complexion of 
. divergence and contrariety that is puzzling and confusing. A rate 
is unreasonable in one instance because the length of the haul is 
ignored, and in another instance the mileage is unconsidered in the 
':final determination. A preference is declared undue against one 
19cality because of its geographical position, and in another case 
the natural advantages of location are equalized by similar rates to a 
less fortunately sittiated community. 
rhe variableness of these elements complicate rate questions. But 
underlying the variable values, there are certain fixed principles, and 
if this distinction be borne in mind, it will become apparent that the 
rate decisions are, as a rule, in harmony, and that a system of rate 
law is being built up, precedents are being established, and principles 
fixed. 
The factors entering into rates must be looked upon as a chemist 
conceives of atoms of strong and wide affinities. Place them in a 
solution of ~ rate controv~rsy and they will combine with many other 
atoms, and the resultant molecules give the final compound its 
identity. 
No rate factor can be considered alone. Every rate factor must be 
considered relatively. The effect of the factors on each other must 
be first determined before the final result can be announced. 
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This sounds ~ore complex ·and more difficult than in fact it is. 
An examination of the elements, their variability, their effect upon 
each other, is not so abstruse a problem. While mathematical ac-
curacy in rates cannot be maintained, it is easily within the realm 
of adm!nistrative justice to decide between reasonable and unreas-
onable rates, and just and unjust discrimination. 
The duty of common carriers to make just and reasonable charges 
'for services rendered in the transportation of persons and property 
existed at common law.1 It is the same duty that is declared in tJie 
A~ TO lti:GUI,ATE COMMERCE. 
The reasonableness of charges is a mixed question of law and of 
fact. It raises the issue of the qualitative character of an act. To 
determine this issue certain evidential facts must be found and from 
these facts a oonclusion is drawn. 
The Commission's ultimate conclusion must be drawn in accord-
ance with certain legal principles. The legal principles are few, and 
govern very brojldly the· determination of issues. Before the legal 
principles are applied, there may be, and usually are, certain inf er-
ences of fact. The legal principles are fixed and conclusive. The 
inferences of fact may change or be affected by additional facts, and 
are always subject to rebuttal. The two bodies of rules should be 
considered separately. 
I. The right at common law to regulate the ·charges of a com-
mon carrier arose from the doctrine that when private property was 
devoted to a public use, the public acquired a right to the use upon 
reasonable terms. 
In Munn v. Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld the doctrine that 
in property devoted to a public use, the public had such an interest 
that it might regulate through legislatures the charges, and conse-
quently the revenues derived from such property by the owners. 
This power of regulation by the legislative authority was no~ subject 
to the review of courts. "Where property has been Clothed ,with a 
public interest, the legislature may fix a limit to that which shall in 
law be reasonable for its use. This limit binds the courts as well as 
the people. If it has been improperly fixed, the legislature, not the 
courts must be appealed to for the change."2 
Later decisions, while confirming the right to regulate, began to 
limit the legislative authority, until in Smyth v. Ames,~ the Supreme 
Court declared that rates prescribed by legislative authority must' 
yield a fair return upon the property, and when rates so prescn"bed 
i Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. n3. 
• Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., g4 U. S. 164, 178 • 
• 169 u. s. 466. 
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did not yield a fair return they were confiscatory, and amounted to 
a deprivation of property without due process of law. 
A minimum was marked to legislative authority. A line was 
drawn, beneath which confiscation set in. Confiscation, or depriva-
tion of property, contrary to the constitutional right, is brought 
about by a revenue inadequate to constitute a fair return. 
This deprivation of property may consist of two kinds: (I) The 
revenue derived from the rates prescribed may be less than the 
operating expenditures,4 In this event the rates are unreasonably 
low and to attain reasonableness· the rates i;nust yield an equivalent 
of the expenditures.5 
(2) The revenue derived from the rates prescribed may yield so 
smaU. a margin above operating expenditures that (a) the corpus of 
the property is by this 'process being confiscated by rendering it un-
desirable to purchasers and therefore decreasing its value, or (b) the 
owners are deprived of their property right of a return upon the 
iµvestment. When ·the sufficiency of the margin above expenditures 
is in question, it becomes necessary to determine what constitutes a 
fair return. How shall it be analyzed? No bard and fast rule can 
, be prescribed. It is a field for discretion as broad as the field of 
inquiry into the reasonableness of rates. 
It has been rather generally conceded that since the decision of 
·the Supreme Court in Smyth v. Antes,6 one absolute essential of 
rates is that they· must yield a fair return upon the value of the 
property. This is not an absolute right, enforceable at the expense 
of all other rights and persons. In the summing up of principles laid 
down in that case Mr. Justice HARLAN said :7 
"A State enactment, or regulations made under the authority of 
a State enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of per-
sons or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earn-
ing such compensation as under· all the circumstances is just to it 
and to the public would deprive such carrier of its property without 
due process of law." · 
The earlier doctrine announced in Co1.1ington & Lexington Turn-
pike R. Co. v. Sanford,8 has been neglected, perhaps, but not utte,rly 
abandoned. In that case the court said: 
• By operating is meant aU oirerhead expenses, etc. 
.-.. In this connection a question may- arise as to the. ·carrier'• expenditures. They. 
should not be reckless, atravagant, or wasteful. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman 
X43 U. S. 339, 346. . > 
• 169 u. s. 466. 
T 169 U. S. at page 5#i;. 
• 164 u. s. 578. 
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"The public cannot be subjected to unreasonable rates in order 
simply that stockholders may eam dividends. * * * If a corpora-
tion cannot maintain such a highway and earn dividends for stock-
holders, it is a misfortune for it and them which the constitution 
does not require to be remedied by imposing unjust burdens upon the 
public." 
The later cases following Sm'j•th v. Ames on this question, North-
'em Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota,9 Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. 
Conley,1° the Minnesota Rate Cases,11 have not denied the factor 
value of the service to the public. 
If the return upon the property were the only factor in rate-mak-
ing the problem would be simple. But it must be considered in com-
bination with that equally potent factor, the value of the service to 
the public. ·Here are two conflicting and opposing elements, con-
stantly tending to neutralize or restrict each other. And the fairness 
of one depends upon the other, so that no formula can be blindly 
followed. 
It leads us back into the original inquiry-the reasonableness of 
rates. A fair return may by force of circumstances be a fraction 
of one per cent. It is to be remembered that the legal inference that 
rates must yield a fair return is applicable upon rate structures as a 
whole. It is not a practical consideration in determining the reason-
ableness of isolated rates. Theoretically each rate has a cost of 
service and a revenue producing power, but only theoretically. Rail-
way accounting has not progressed so far. 
A whole rate st.ructure produces a known sum, and an average 
cost of service, in units of ton miles, or car miles, may be estimated. 
But it is obvious that rates on different commodities vary above and 
befow the average. 
A single commodity may not be segregated and a rate therefore· 
imposed that is less than the cost of service.12 But if rates on a 
single commodity yield any revenue in excess of cost, no legal infer-
ence is applicabfo, because the inargin then raises the question of a· 
fair return. 
2. That rates shall not be confiscatory is tpe only element in the 
reasonableness of rates that has a fixed legal inference. 
Attempts have been made to have the Supreme Court declare other 
legal inferences.. And while they have uniformly failed, an examina-
• .236 u. s. 585, 599. 
:It .236 u. s. 605. 
u .230 u. s. ;t52. 
12 Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota, .236 U. S. 585; and 1ff: review of 
former cases. 
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tion of those conside;ed in the case of Illinois Central R. R. v. 
Interstate Commerce Commission,18 is very enlightening upon this 
subject. 
In that case there were presented to the court the following cir-
cumstances, which it was claimed raised the legal presumption that 
the rate was reasonable: 
(I) A rate legally published. 
( 2) A rate made by competition. 
(3) A rate as low as rates of other. carriers on similar com-
. modities for similar distances . 
. (4) A rate maintained for a series of years, and under which 
there has been a continuous increase in business. 
(5) Rates under which a commodity moves with profit to a 
shipper, reduced as the market declines, increased as the market 
. advances, the percentage of increase in th~ rate bf!ing less than the 
percentage .of increase in the commodity. 
( 6) Rates decreased during a market depression and advanced to 
their former level when the depression ceases. 
(7) Increases in a schedule of rates to meet increases in expendi-
tures to -care for an abnormal iiicrease of traffic when the gross 
earnings of the carrier yield no greater net income. · 
(9 and IO) Increases in rates to pay for improvements. 
(II) A rate must yield the cost of movement and contribute its 
fair share of operating expenses, taxes, and fixed charges. 
Said the courtu in discussing these contentions : 
"A presumption is the e.xpression of a process of reasoning and 
most, if not all, the rules of indirect evidence may be expressed as 
such. We cannot go far in the investigation of any controverpy 
without finding ourselves compelled to infer one fact from another, 
b11t we would not therefore be justified in declaring such inferences 
legal maxims. It is tq this that appellants invite us and seek to erect 
disputable inferences from conduct that may ha'Ve many explanations 
into intendments of law. * * *· 
"It is conceded, as we have said, that the presumptions contended 
for by appellants are mixed.of law and fact, ·except, may be, those 
which we shall presently consider. If either element is dominant in 
such presumptions, it must be that of fact. In other words, the fact 
must be ascertained before the law draws its inference." 
The court might· have gone further, and declared that not only 
n"Ust the fact be ascertained, but the surrounding circumstances and 
:la 206 u. s. 441. 
1' .206 U. S. 441, at pp. 459, 46o. 
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conditions, before the law draws its inference. For if it be estab-
lished, for example, that a rate was made by competition, that factor 
alone is not a presumption of its reasonableness. It is material and 
pertinent evidence, and something to which the Commission should 
give weight. But any presumption arising from it alone, is so faint 
and weak that it must have support. · 
And as pointed out by the court in the above cited case,11l a legally 
filed rate has no presumption of reasonableness. "Of course, if a 
complaint should be filed before the Commission, and no proof ad-
duced to support it, we cannot doubt but that the complaint would 
be dismissed; but this because of the principle that the party who 
asserts the affirmative in any controversy· ought to prove the asser-
tion, and that he who denies may rest in his denial 'until, at least, the 
probable truth of the matter asserted has been establishedt 
Various elements that enter into the reasonableness of rates have 
from time to time been approved by the Supr~e Court.16 But the 
approval does not give them any force as legal presumptions, because 
no single element is controlling. 
The Commission has the power to prescribe reasonable rates. 
We are met at the outset with the difficulty of defining except in 
the vaguest terms what is a reasonable rate. We can only entuner-
ate the factors entering into rate. making, and, remembering .that they 
are variable, and interdependent, state the approximate value to be 
attached to each. 
In Proposed Advances in Freight Rates,11 the Commission said:• 
''Every question as to the reasonableness of a rate may present itself 
in two aspects. First, is the rate reasonable, estimated by the cost 
and value of the sen.ice, and as compared with other commodities; 
second, is it reasonable in the absolute, regarded more nearly as a 
tax laid upon the people who ultimately pay that rate." 
u 206 U, S. 441,. at p. 464-
11 Competition: United States v. Freight Ass'n., 166 U. S. 33!H United States v, 
Joint Traffic Ass'n., 171 U. S. 505, 577; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago 
Great Western R. R. Co., 209 U. S. 108, n9. 
Value of the service to the shipper! Tens & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com· 
merce Commission, 162 U. S. 197. 
Cost of service: Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, and 
cases cited. 
Value of the commodity transp_orted: Kansas City South;rn Ry. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 
639, 650, 6i;3. . . 
Policy" o( the carrier 'in fixing rates not an element of reasonableness: Southern 
Pacific Co. v. interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 444-
Rates long in effect: Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 6or. 
·Local and through rates: Minnesota & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S • 
.:zs7, 2~2; Chicago RY.: v. "TonipkinS, 176 u, s. 167. 
119 'I. c. c. 382, '401. . : 
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The cost of service and value of service are the evidential facts 
that determine the reasonableness of rates. 
· A comparison with rates on other commodities is only a method 
of det~rmining the cost and value of service. The cost and value of 
':"?ervice as a whole in the rate on the cominodity compared has either 
been approved as reasonable or is assumed to be reasonable. 
What reasonableness is in' the.absolute would be difficult to say. 
Rates may be compared to taxes for illustrative purposes but the 
comparison brings us little nearer a d~finite finding of reasonableness. 
The cost of the.service to the carrier. for which the charge is made 
is a factor tending to increase rates. 'fhe ,.alue of the service to the 
shipper is a factor tending to decrease the rates. Each factor is made 
up of many elements that vary in number and in weight. And some-
times the same element enters into both factors. 
Elements that enter into the cost of service may be grouped under 
two heads: those inherent to the commodity, and those inherent to 
the instrumentality of transportation. Under the first group would 
come weight, package, value, perishable nature, bulk, loading quality. 
Under the second group would come distance, car capacity, speed, 
branch or ma]µ line, topography of country, direction of movement, 
·empties, car supply, volume of traffic, direction of traffic, construe-
, tion cost and maintenance.18 
Elements that enter into the value of service to shipper are compe-
tition (rail, water and market), value, and nature of the com-
modity.19 ' 
· The Commission has from time to time announced various infer-
ences of fact that arise from certain of ·these elements. But, as has 
been noted, all of these inferences are ·subject to the particular 
circumstances and conditions of each case. 
As illustrative of how the value of any one element is affected by 
other elements, .we may examine distance. Distance is an element 
entering into the cost of service whose effect is apparent at a glance. 
But as it is obvious that rates can not be based on a mileage scale, 
the Clement of distance is used in arriving at the per ton mile earn-
ings of the carrier·frotn ·11 particular rate. 20 The maxim that the rate 
per _ton mile should decrease with the length of the haul is logical 
and fair. But the rate can not be measured by this unit alone. The 
bulk of .Mttlm'odities; wading capacity, etc, must be considered. So 
18 This grouping is only for convenience, and -is not suggested as exhaustive either 
as to groups or elements. 1 
,., See Watkins, Shippers and Carriers, §u~'. 
,. This is fignred by reducing the rate per 100 pounds to a rate per ton and then 
dividing by the distance of the hau1 on which it applies. 
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the car mile revenue is considered. The revenue per car mile21 gives 
effect to the additional elements named. But the car mile revenue 
unit must be considered with a view to traffic conditions. If the 
commodity is hauled in special equipment, the return haul is empty, 
and commodities in usual equipment may involve a percentage of 
empty cars returned. 22 
So the direction of movement, the return haul of empties, must be 
tonsidered. And a further unit of comparison, train mile earnings; 
is used, which includes the additional elements of volume and 
tonnage.23 
It is evident that the facts concerning these elements, especially 
those relating to cost of service, would be very difficult for a shipper 
to adduce, and are peculiarly within the possession of the carriers. 
Congress has recognized this condition by enacting in the 19ro 
amendment to the act to regulate commerce that the carrier must 
prove the reasonableness of any advance in rates. 
\Vhen an existing rate is assailed as unreasonable by a shipper he 
is forced to rely mainly upon rate comparisons. And, as has been 
noted, this is only a convenient form of exhibiting the result of 
similar cost and value of service instead of exhibiting the con-
stituent elements, the rates used as comparisons having either been 
found reasonable by the Commission, or assumed so from their 
publication by the carriers. It is essential, of course, that the rates 
used for comparative purposes should be over lines and between 
points where the conditions and circumstances are similar. Pis-
similarity of conditions means dissimilarity of the constituent ele-
ments out of which the rates are constructed, and the comparison 
would have no probative value.u 
The technical nature of the evidence necessary to determine the 
reasonableness of rates, the inability of the shipper to adduce it, and 
its possession by the carrier, are responsible to some extent for the 
procedure befor~ the Commission. The complainant can rarely un-
aided make out his case. The defendant must supply the evidential 
facts. Arid in effect, every complaint carries with it a prayer for 
discovery. 
Decisions of the Commission and of the courts have often recited 
that the reasonableness of a rate is a question of fact, and that the 
21This is derived from multiplying the average carload weight of the ccimmoditT" 
by the rate and dividing by the distance· of the haul. 
22 Western Rate Advance Case, (1~15), 35 I. C. C. 497. 
22 For authorities see 'Vatkins, Shippers and Carriers, §g9. 
"Dallas Freight Bureau v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 12 I. C. C. :n3; Ctark & Co. 
v. Buffalo & S. Ry., 18 I. C. C. aBo; Parfrey v. C. M. & P. Ry. Co., 20 I. C. C. 103; 
Watkins, Shippers and Carriers, §no, and citations. 
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:findi~g of the Commission thereon is final. And as the process of 
determining the evidential facts, and drawing therefrom their proper 
inference and legal conclusions, is often obscure, it sometimes seems 
that rate decisions are mysteriously effected. It may appear that the 
Commission thrusts its hand into the darkness, and a reasonable rate 
is plucked back like a rabbit from a conjuror's hat. · 
There is, of course, no step taken towards the ultimate finding 
which is not logical. · 
The process of determining the reasonableness of rates consists of 
two stages. The first stage, finding the evidential facts, is within the 
exclusive discretionary power of the Commission and its findings so 
far are final. The second stage is deductive reasoning, and presents 
a question of law. It is a question of law, for example, when the 
Commissi9n determines the reasonableness of rates upon the con-
clusi9n that. rates -equitable to shipper~ are therefore reasonable.25 
Here the evidential facts did not warrant the conclusion of reason-
ableness. 
When the evidence is a "mass of facts--out of which experts 
could have named a rate,'' the Commission's conclusion from those 
facts, is a conclusion of law. ThC'.! findings of fact being final, the 
legal conclusion therefrom was proper.28 
The conclusion of reasonableness must always be supported by 
evidential facts. When the facts conflict, or their relative weight is 
in question, the Commi1sion's finding is final. And in this field there 
are wide limits' to the flexibility of its judgment. But it is not a 
tribunal of arbitrary nor ~imited powers. 
Washington, D. C. 
• Southern· Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 444-
"' Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 550. 
